Functioning as adverbials, yídìng and shìbì in Mandarin Chinese can either express intensification or (strong) epistemic necessity. In addition, context influences their semantics. Hence, dynamic semantics are proposed for them. An information state  is a pair <A, s>, where s is a proposition and A is an affirmative ordering. Yídìng() performs update on an information state: A is updated with  and s is specified to be a subset of or equal of , as long as  is true in one of the absolutely affirmative worlds. Otherwise, uttering yídìng() leads to an absurd state. This is how a strong epistemic necessity reading is derived. To yield an intensification reading, yídìng() performs a test on the information state. Yídìng() gives back the original information state as long as  is true in all of the absolutely affirmative worlds. Otherwise, an absurd state is produced. As for shìbì, its semantics is identical to that of yídìng, except for that the s in an information state  for shìbì is underspecified and needs resolving before a proposition gets an appropriate interpretation. The information needed to resolve the underspecified s for shìbì must be inferred from the context.
Introduction
In Mandarin Chinese (henceforth, Chinese), intensification and modal necessity can be expressed by the same lexical item. Adverbial yídìng is one of such lexical items.
1 Please refer to the following examples.
( 1 Please note that yídìng can function either as a nominal modifier or a propositional modifier. The former is referred to as adjectival yídìng and the latter adverbial yídìng. This paper discusses adverbial yídìng only because the semantics of adjectival yídìng is simple and not as rich as adverbial yídìng. 2 The abbreviations used in this paper include: ASSO for an associative marker, DEON for a deontic modal expression, DYN for a dynamic modal expression, EPI for an epistemic modal expression, Prc for a sentence-final particle, Prg for a progressive marker, Q for an interrogative particle.
(1) contains two conversations: one between A and B, and the other between A and B'. In the two conversations, A asks whether Zhangsan likes Xiaomei. Although the same sentence Zhāngsān yídìng xǐhuān Xiǎoměi 'Zhangsan YÍDÌNG like Xiaomei' is uttered as a response to A's question, yídìng has different semantic functions. In the utterance of B, yídìng expresses epistemic necessity because B says that the proposition Zhāngsān yídìng xǐhuān Xiǎoměi 'Zhangsan YÍDÌNG like Xiaomei' is a reasonable conjecture. Yídìng of this usage is translated as it must be the case that… Moreover, when expressing epistemic necessity, yídìng expresses 'strong' epistemic necessity. The following examples demonstrate the difference between epistemic necessity and 'strong' epistemic necessity.
(2) a. The difference between (2a) and (2b) lies in that (2a) contains yídìng, while (2b) uses huì. Huì has several meanings and one of them is inference, e.g. Chang (2000) , Liu (1997), etc. In (2b) , huì is used express an inference about a future situation based the antecedent led by rúguǒ 'if'. Although yídìng in (2a) has a similar function, (2a) and (2b) have a subtle semantic difference: (2a) shows a stronger certainty of the speaker's regarding the truth of the proposition your Mom will be angry, compared to (2b). Hence, when used to indicate an inference, yídìng is said to express 'strong' epistemic necessity.
On the other hand, yídìng in the utterance of B' has a different semantic function. In this utterance, yídìng is used to intensify the speaker's affirmativeness toward the proposition your Mom will be angry, instead of expressing the proposition as an inference. In (3a, b), yídìng and shìbì are interchangeable and these two sentences are pretty much synonymous. However, in (4a, b), they are not interchangeable. In (4a), only yídìng is allowed, whereas in (4b) only shìbì is permissible.
In this paper, I would like to address the following questions. First, is it possible to provide a unified semantics for yídìng and shìbì? Second, how can the unified semantics account for the semantic similarity and difference between yídìng and shìbì as demonstrated in (3) and (4)? Finally, how can the unified semantics take care of contextual influence on the semantics of yídìng and shìbì illustrated by the utterances of B and of B' in (1)? This paper is organized as follows. In Section Two, I critically review literature on yídìng and shìbì. In Section Three, I present more data and provide dynamic semantics for yídìng and shìbì. Section Four concludes this paper.
Review of Previous Studies
The literature on yídìng and/or shìbì include Chen (2011 ), Ding (2008a , C. Li (2005) , S. Li (2009 ), Wang (2007 , Xu (1995) , Zhou (2014 ), etc. Xu (1995 is on the English translations of yídìng and two other adverbs and is not reviewed here. I critically review the other seven studies.
I start with the literature on yídìng and conduct the review in chronological order. Li (2005) distinguishes two variants of yídìng, labeled as yídìng 1 and yídìng 2 . He suggests that the former expresses strong volition, either the subject's or the speaker's strong volition (for another person) to do something, while the latter denotes stipulation or judgment. He further claims that yídìng 1 often goes with yào, which expresses a deontic reading here, or with děi, which also has a deontic reading, and that yídìng 2 often goes with shi 'be' or hui, which denotes epistemic necessity.
A major problem with Li (2005) is that he does not take the intensification reading into consideration, such as the utterance of B' in (1). Another problem is that the semantic contribution of yídìng is blurred when it goes with another modal expression. For example, he suggests that yídìng děi 'YÍDÌNG DEON' expresses a deontic reading. Then, a reasonable question to ask is what semantic contribution yídìng has here. The same problem occurs to yídìng huì 'YÍDÌNG EPI'. Ding (2008a, b) also discusses the semantics of yídìng. These two studies distinguish yídìng 1 from yídìng 2 as well. Similar to Li (2005) , Ding (2008a, b) claims that yídìng 1 expresses strong volition and yídìng 2 denotes emphasis on the truth of an inference/judgment. Ding's (2008a, b) conclusion is similar to Li (2005) and hence suffers from the same problems.
Chen (2011) is mostly on the grammaticalization of yídìng. As for the semantics of yídìng, he claims that yídìng expresses strong volition or stipulation/inference. Since Chen's (2011) conclusion is identical to Li (2005) and Ding (2008a, b) , and therefore is vulnerable to the same problems.
Two major problems shared by Chen (2011 ), Ding (2008a and Li (2005) are the following. First, they do not discuss whether it is possible to provide a unified semantics for yídìng, and second, they do not discuss how the contextual influence on the semantics of yídìng as demonstrated in the two conversations in (1) should be dealt with.
S. Li (2009 ), Wang (2007 and Zhou (2014) focus on shìbì. These three studies are also reviewed in chronological order. Wang (2007) is on the lexicalization of shìbì. This paper suggests that shìbì describes an inference made based on a current situation. S. Li (2009) is about the historical development of shìbì. This study states that shìbì expresses an inference that some situation is certain to take place in the future, based on the current status of some other situation. Zhou (2014) provides a relatively detailed discussion on the semantic features of shìbì, but basically says the same thing as S. Li (2009) and Wang (2007) . While epistemic necessity is one of the readings expressed by shìbì, these studies cannot explain why shìbì is not good in (4a), which also has an epistemic necessity reading, and neither do they take the intensification reading, such as (3a), into consideration.
Since the above reviewed papers do not provide a comprehensive picture for the semantics of yídìng and shìbì, further study is called for so that the unanswered questions can be addressed.
Semantics of Yídìng and Shìbì

The Data
Yídìng can either present a proposition without a modal expression or one with a modal expression. The utterances of B and of B' in (1), and the sentence (2a) are typical examples where yídìng presents a proposition not containing a modal expression. (3a) is an example where yídìng presents a modal containing a modal expression. Either case, yídìng is ambiguous between a strong epistemic reading and an intensification reading. Let's look at a few more examples. (5) Some native speakers I consult point out to me that, standing alone, (6b) preferably has an intensification reading, rather than a strong epistemic necessity reading. However, if we provide a context for the sentence, the strong epistemic necessity reading can be brought out. For example, (7) Sūnqī yídìng děi dǎsǎo fángjiān le.
Sunqi YÍDÌNG DEON clean room Prc Zhè shì wǒ-de tuīcè. Tā-de fùmǔ this be my conjecture his parents yǐjīng shòubǔliǎo le. already tolerate.not Prc 'It must be the case that Sunqi has to clean his room. This is my guess. His parents cannot tolerate it anymore.' So, can a unified semantics be proposed for yídìng? I believe so. The examples presented in this section and previous sections tell us that the semantics of yídìng contains two parts. The first part provides an epistemic necessity reading, just like must in English. The other part provides an intensification reading.
If we put aside the contextual influence on the semantics of yídìng for the moment, the semantics of yídìng can be modeled using Kratzer's (2012 Kratzer's ( [1981 , 1991) semantics of modal expressions. See (8). In (8), the modal base, modal force and one of the ordering sources in (a) together are actually the typical semantics for an epistemic necessary modal expression. The new idea here is the second ordering source, the affirmative ordering source. von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) propose that weak necessity modals such as should in English need two ordering sources for their semantics. The idea of two ordering sources is adopted here.
What is an affirmative ordering source? An affirmative ordering source orders possible worlds in terms of the speaker's affirmativeness toward a proposition. A represents an affirmative ordering source. Then, the ordering of two possible worlds based on an affirmative ordering source is defined as below. (9) In (10a), yídìng is good, but shìbì is not. 331 examples of shìbì are retrieved from the online version of the Sinica Corpus. Examining these examples carefully, I find that, whenever shìbì is used, additional information must be present so that the sentence with shìbì can be inferred. For example, in (10b), moving to Indonesia after getting married leads to the event that the speaker has to quit his/her current job. The same reasoning applies to (11a, b).
Therefore, the first difference between yídìng and shìbì is that the former does not need the context to explicitly provide information based on which the proposition presented by yídìng can be inferred, whereas the latter does. In (10a), shìbì is not good because of lack of such information.
What happens if another modal expression, other than yídìng and shìbì, occurs in the sentences, such as (11a, b)? In these cases, yídìng and shìbì are interchangeable, and they are ambiguous as discussed above.
So, what is the semantics of shìbì and how is it related to that of yídìng? (10) sheds some light on this question. Again, putting contextual influence aside, I propose that the modal base of shìbì and the ordering source related to the modal base are both underspecified, while the affirmative ordering source is always there for shìbì. Shìbì cannot be used in (10a) because information required to infer the proposition presented by shìbì does not exist. The lack of such information makes it impossible to resolve the underspecified modal base (and the underspecified ordering source) of shìbì.
On the other hand, in (10b), if one moves out of town, then it is most likely required for him/her to quit his/her current job in town. That is, the relation between the two clauses in (10b) indicates a deontic reading and the underspecified modal base of shìbì is resolved to circumstantial and the ordering source is related to a physical law: if one is not at a place, he cannot hold a job at that place.
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In sum, putting contextual influence aside, I propose the following. Yídìng has an epistemic modal base and two ordering sources. One is doxastic or stereotypical and the other is affirmative. An affirmative ordering source orders possible worlds in terms of the degree of speaker's affirmativeness concerning a proposition. Shìbì has an underspecified modal base and two ordering sources. One of the ordering sources is underspecified as well because it needs to be compatible with the modal base. The other is an affirmative one.
Dynamic Semantics for Yídìng and Shìbì
Although, in Section 3.1, semantics are proposed, along the lines of Kratzer (2012 Kratzer ( [1981 , 1991), for yídìng and shìbì, Kratzer's semantics of modality cannot take care of contextual influence, which is demonstrated in the two conversations in (1). There is no mechanism in Kratzer's semantics of modality (and in truth-conditional semantics as well) to deal with contextual effects.
Instead, I would like to propose dynamic semantics (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991, Chierchia 1995, etc.) 4 for yídìng and shìbì so that contextual effects can be taken care of. Yalcin (2007) discusses why sentences such as suppose that it is raining but it might not be is infelicitous. In order to take care of embedded epistemic modals, a clause embedded under suppose must be interpreted accord-ing to what the subject supposes. Hence, one version of Yalcin's (2007) proposal is as follows: (12) c. ||Suppose that it is raining but it might not be|| = w'S w,x :|||| c, S w, x , w' is true w'S w, x : |||| c, S w, x , w' is true (12c) is a contradiction because it is not plausible that S w, x contains a possible world where  and  are both true at the same time. Yalcin's (2007) idea applies to yídìng and shìbì as well because of the infelicity of the following example:
(13) tiān zhème hēi, xiànzài yídìng/shìbì sky so dark now YÍDÌNG/SHÌBÌ zài xiàyù. #dànshì, yě yǒu kěnéng Prg rain #but also have possibility méiyǒu not 'It is so dark. Now, it must be the case that it is raining, #but it may not be.' But, Yalcin's (2007) idea alone is not adequate for yídìng and shìbì because they denote a 'strong' epistemic necessity reading, rather than simple epistemic necessity. Is it possible to incorporate the affirmative ordering source as defined in Section 3.1 into an information state, i.e. what Yalcin (2007) refers to as s? Veltman's (1996) proposal can help us here.
In order to account for the semantics of normally and presumably, Veltman (1996) propose that an information state is a pair  = <, s>. s is a proposition and Yalcin's (2007) s or S w, x is one type of Veltman's (1996) s.  is an expectation pattern, i.e. an ordering of possible worlds, where w   v iff every expectation which is met by v is also met by w (Veltman 1996: 13) .
Combining Veltman (1996) and Yalcin (2007) , I propose that for yídìng and shìbì the information state  is also a pair and that  = <A, s>. s is a proposition, as in Veltman (1996) and Yalcin (2007) . A is an affirmative ordering, where w  A v if and only if every proposition which is affirmed to be true in v is also affirmed to be true in w.
In addition, in order to account for the high degree of affirmativness in the semantics of yídìng and shìbì, we define absolutely affirmative words as (14a). We also need to update the affirmative ordering with a proposition, so that the proposition is true in the worlds where more propositions are affirmed to be true, as defined in (14b): (14) AffA is a set of possible worlds each of whose members has more propositions affirmed to be true than one of the other possible worlds in W. AffA is referred to as the absolutely affirmative worlds because all the worlds in this set contain only propositions affirmed to be true.
(14b) is the definition of updating A with : A is a pair <w, v>, where, if  is true in v, then  is also true in w, that is, the affirmative ordering takes  into consideration. In this way, we can relate a proposition  to an affirmative ordering A. (15a) accounts for the strong epistemic necessity reading yídìng can denote. The ordering source A is updated with the proposition . This update relates  to the order A so that the affirmative ordering takes  into consideration. Just like Yalcin (2007) , s says that  is interpreted with respect to s, the speaker's knowledge. There is a condition for the new information state <A, s> to hold:
 must be true in one of the absolutely affirmative worlds. This condition is stated as AffA  {w: |||| w, M = 1} . If the condition does not hold, then A fails and uttering the ||yídìng()|| M produces an absurd state.
As for the intensification reading, since this is not an inference or judgment, s does not equal to the speaker's knowledge in w. Instead of updating the information state, an intensification reading simply performs a test, as stated in (15b). As long as  is true in all of the absolutely affirmative worlds, then ||yídìng()|| M gives back the original information state. If the condition does not hold, then an absurd state is yielded.
How about shìbì? As pointed out in Section 3.1, the difference between yídìng and shìbì lies in that the modal base of shìbì is underspecified. If we examine the information state  carefully, we can find that s in  functions in a way similar to a modal base. Hence, I propose that the s in the information state for shíbí is underspecified and must be resolved before a sentence containing shìbì can get an appropriate interpretation. I formalize the idea as follows: In (16a), s = ? stands for an underspecified s. In (16b), R(, ) means that  and  have a certain relation R. This R resolves the underspecified s. For example, in (10b), the two clauses are related because of a physical law, which says that one needs to live in a reasonable distance from where his job is. For this example, this physical law resolves s and hence (10b) can get an appropriate interpretation. Except for (16a, b), the semantics of shìbì is identical to that of yídìng, as in (15). Now, with the dynamic semantics (15) and (16), we can successfully explain the two conversations in (1). For the conversation between A and B, since B says that this is a reasonable conjecture, s must represent the speaker's knowledge. Therefore, (15b) is ruled out. The information state is updated and we a strong epistemic necessity reading.
On the other hand, for the conversation between A and B', since B' says that this is a widely-known fact, s cannot be equal to the speaker's knowledge. Hence, (15b) kicks in and we get an intensification reading.
In this section, I propose dynamic semantics for yídìng and shìbì. Both of these adverbials have an information state <A, s>, where s is a proposition and A is an affirmative ordering. To derive a strong epistemic necessity reading, yídìng and shìbì update A with a proposition they present and specify that the proposition is a subset of or equal to s. This update holds if  is true in one of the absolutely affirmative worlds. To produce an intensification reading, a check is performed on an information state: if  is true in all of the absolutely affirmative worlds, the original information state is returned. If the condition is not satisfied, neither strong epistemic necessity reading nor intensification reading can be produced. This is the unified semantics for yídìng and shìbì.
Their difference is that the s in an information state <A, s> for shìbì is underspecified, and needs to be contextually resolved so that a proposition presented by shìbì can get a proper reading.
Conclusion
In this paper, I propose dynamic semantics for yídìng and shìbì because truth-conditional semantics cannot deal with contextual effects in the semantics of yídìng and shìbì. Following Veltman (1996) , I propose an information state  is a pair <A, s>, where s is a proposition and A is an affirmative ordering. Yídìng() performs update on an information state: A is update with  and s is specified to be a subset of or equal of , as long as  is true in one of the absolutely affirmative worlds. Otherwise, uttering yídìng() leads to an absurd state. This is how a strong epistemic necessity reading is derived.
On the other hand, to yield an intensification reading, yídìng() performs a test on an information state. Yídìng() gives back the original information state as long as  is true in all of the absolutely affirmative worlds. Otherwise, an absurd state is produced.
As for shìbì, its semantics is identical to that of yídìng, except for the following: the s in an information state  for shìbì is underspecified and needs to be resolved before a proposition presented by shìbì can get an appropriate interpretation. The information needed to resolve the underspecified s for shìbì must be inferred from the context.
